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Abstract
We consider a simple model of international trade under uncer-
tainty, where production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. The
riskiness of production depends on the choices of the producers, not
observable to the general public, and these choices are inﬂuenced by
the availability and cost of credit. If investment is ﬁnanced by a bond
market, then a situation may arise where otherwise identical coun-
tries end up with diﬀerent levels of interest and diﬀerent choices of
technique, which again implies diﬀerences in achieved level of welfare.
Under suitable conditions on the parameters of the model, the market
may not be able to supply credits to one of the countries.
The introduction of ﬁnancial intermediaries with the ability to con-
trol the debtors may change this situation in a direction which is
welfare improving (in a suitable sense) by increasing expected out-
put in the country with high interest rates, while opening up for new
problems of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring
activity of the banks.
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Resumo
N´ os consideramos um modelo simples de com´ ercio internacional
com incerteza, onde a produ¸ c˜ ao envolve tempo e est´ a sujeita ` a in-
certeza. A natureza arriscada da produ¸ c˜ ao depende das escolhas dos
produtores, n˜ ao observ´ avel ao p´ ublico em geral, e essas escolhas s˜ ao
inﬂuenciadas pela disponibilidade e custo do cr´ edito. Se o investi-
mento ´ e ﬁnanciado no mercado de t´ ıtulos, ent˜ ao pode acontecer a
situa¸ c˜ ao em que pa´ ıses idˆ enticos, em tudo o mais, acabam com n´ ıveis
diferentes de taxas de juros e diferentes escolhas de tecnologia, que
implica novamente em n´ ıveis diferentes de bem estar. Sob condi¸ c˜ oes
adequadas dos parˆ ametros do modelo, o mercado pode n˜ ao ser capaz
de ofertar cr´ editos para um dos pa´ ıses.
A introdu¸ c˜ ao de intermedi´ arios ﬁnanceiros com a habilidade de con-
trolar os devedores pode mudar esta situa¸ c˜ ao em uma dire¸ c˜ ao que me-
lhora o bem estar (em um sentido adequado) pelo crescimento do pro-
duto esperado no pa´ ıs com elevadas taxas de juros, enquanto enfrenta
novos problemas de informa¸ c˜ ao assim´ etrica com respeito a atividade
de monitoramento dos bancos.
1 Introduction
One of the great challenges of the Latin American economies
in the era of globalization is to secure healthy ﬁnancial institu-
tions which may attract both local and foreign capital to do-
mestic investments. The negative consequences of many of the
policies which have been predominating in the latter years have
⋆ The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing
out several errors and shortcomings in a previous version.
Communicating author: Hans Keiding, Institute of Economics, Uni-
versity of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K,
Denmark. Email address: Hans.Keiding@pop.oko.ku.dk
190 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.5, n.2, p.189–219, Jul/Dec. 2004Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade
been pointed out in the debate, for example in connection with
the economic crisis in Argentina (cf. e.g. Mussa (2002), Ferrer
(2003)).
The problems connected with capital outﬂow have been investi-
gated also from a theoretical viewpoint (see e.g. Tornell and Ve-
lasco (1992), Collier et al. (2001)). It may be argued, as indeed it
has been, that many of the problems reside in the banking sector
of the less developed countries, which may not be adapted to the
actual situation of free capital movements. However, it may be
argued that the working of the banking sector in the context of
international trade and ﬁnance is not very well understood, or
at least it is only sparsely treated in the literature, which largely
stays within the framework of perfect foresight and perfect com-
petition. Yet banks as such owe their existence to imperfections
of the competitive mechanism, due to uncertainty combined with
asymmetric information and the consequent lack of markets for
all contingent commodities.
Over the last decades, considerable progress has been made in
direction of achieving a better understanding of how banks func-
tion in a closed economy; the work by e.g. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984) have pointed
to fundamental roles of banks as providing liquidity insurance,
counteracting adverse selection, or monitoring debtors (for a sur-
vey of the ﬁeld, see Freixas and Rochet (1998)). A common
feature of all these approaches is that the uncertainty pertain-
ing to intertemporal transactions is an important feature which,
combined with some aspects of asymmetric information, results
in equilibrium behaviour which diﬀers from that of a perfectly
competitive economy, even with uncertainty taken into account.
Since the presence of asymmetric information takes us from the
ﬁrst-best world of competitive equilibrium to that of market
failures and second-best equilibria, we must expect that im-
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provement does not always result from conventional policy mea-
sures; indeed we shall argue that some of the problems connected
with capital outﬂow and scarcity of capital might be tackled by
strengthening domestic banking, which otherwise might look like
a step backwards from overall free international capital move-
ments and competition in ﬁnancial markets.
In the present paper, we investigate the role of banks - or rather,
one of their roles, since, as mentioned above, modern banking
theory suggests many diﬀerent roles – in a model with several
countries and free trade, not only in commodities but also in
bonds, so that we come as close as possible within the frame-
work of the model to real world situation of globalized capital
markets. The model is deliberately kept simple; we do not aim
to studying commodity trade patterns but only the way in which
a ﬁnancial intermediary may make a diﬀerence. As it turns out,
a ﬁnancial intermediary may improve the situation of a country
treated adversely in the global ﬁnancial equilibrium.
The intuition behind the model is as follows: We consider a world
with two countries, one commodity, and two periods of time.
Firms in each country may choose to produce the output using
either a risky or a less risky technique, and they ﬁnance the pur-
chase of inputs in the ﬁrst period by issuing bonds, which are
contingent claims giving a certain repayment in case of success
(of the risky production project) and nothing in case of failure.
The public can observe whether the project fails or not but the
choice of technique is known only to the ﬁrm. In the money mar-
ket, bonds can be distinguished according to country of origin,
so that the repayment rates of bonds may diﬀer between coun-
tries. We show that an equilibrium may occur where the ﬁrms
of one country must pay a higher price for their investment than
those of the other country, resulting in more risky projects being
chosen and expected production being lower. This situation is an
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example of what is known in the literature as welfare-diminishing
international trade (cf. Newbery and Stiglitz (1984)).
The introduction of ﬁnancial intermediaries or banks with the
ability to monitor ﬁrms’ choices of investment projects may con-
siderably remedy this disadvantage, since banks may provide
loans to the ﬁrms against bonds sold in the market on equal
conditions with those issued by the other country; consequently,
credit is only marginally more expensive (by the amount of the
monitoring cost) in this country, and indeed the banks achieve a
general improvement of welfare (most markedly in the country
which was at a disadvantage in the original equilibrium, but also
to some extent spreading to the rest of the world).
The main message to be obtained from our analysis is that un-
satisfactory performance or slow development in some countries
may be caused by the system of credit allocation rather than
by speciﬁc circumstances of economic or political nature. Even
in cases where the countries are identical in economic structure,
circumstances connected with the credit market may result in
very diﬀerent performance in the two countries. The situation
may be partially remedied by a ﬁnancial intermediary (“bank”)
in the country which is most adversely eﬀected, since the inspec-
tion carried out by such an institution will make it possible to
reduce the price of credits.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce
the model and we discuss the basic moral hazard problem in the
choice of investment by ﬁrms. This is carried further in Section
3, where we add a consumption sector and consider the inter-
national equilibria which obtain in the model. This section also
contains our ﬁrst main result about disadvantageous free trade,
showing that there are equilibria where the countries, though
identical in their economic characteristics, are treated diﬀerently,
with one of the countries subject to capital outﬂow. The follow-
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ing Section 4 introduces ﬁnancial intermediaries with the ability
of monitoring the ﬁrms’ investment policies, and this is shown
to have a positive eﬀect on welfare since (expected) production
increases; in addition production increases in the adversely af-
fected country as its capital outﬂow is reduced.
In Section 5, we discuss some extensions of the model, adding
national labor markets and considering the role of capital stocks
in international credit. We conclude in Section 6 with a discus-
sion of the insights obtained as well as some directions of future
research suggested by the results. Finally, proofs of the proposi-
tions and theorems stated in the text are collected in a separate
section at the end of the paper.
2 The Model: Choice of Technique and Financing In-
vestments
In the present section, we introduce the basic model, starting
with the choices of investment. Our model is one of two coun-
tries which are followed over two periods, 0 and 1. In the ﬁrst
period, the ﬁrms choose an investment which has the form of
a commodity input in a suitably chosen technique, and in the
second period, the resulting output is obtained and sold. In our
model, the investment decision consists of two parts, namely (1)
choice of technique of production, and (2) quantity of input (and,
assuming eﬃcient production, output).
Since the main point of introducing the model is to show that
technologically identical countries may end up in very diﬀerent
positions as a result of the ﬁnancial institutions, we assume that
the techniques to be chosen are the same in the two countries.
Also, and for the same reason, we assume that the countries have
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the same number of identical consumers, so that the asymmetries
that will emerge are caused strictly by the institutions described
in the model.
We assume that there is only one good in the model, to be con-
sumed in either of two periods. Production is subject to uncer-
tainty in the productive sector; there is a possibility of failure
of the investment project at time 1, depending on the choice of
technique. While success or failure is observable, the choice of
technique is known only to the ﬁrm itself, giving rise to a moral
hazard problem.
We assume that in each ﬁrm, there are two distinct types of tech-
niques G and B for producing goods in period 1 from inputs in
period 0; each of these is characterized by a production function
γj : R+ → R,j ∈ {G,B}, describing the output to be obtained
from a given input if the project succeeds; in case of failure, the
output is 0; the production functions are assumed to be diﬀer-
entiable and concave, so that there is decreasing returns to scale
in investment.
The successes or failures of the projects are formalized as follows:
There are three states of nature in period 1,s = 1,2,3, with asso-
ciated probabilities π1,π2,π3, such that both techniques succeed
in state 1, only G in state 2, and none of them in state 3. We
assume that in state 1, the technique B is superior to G in the
sense that it gives more output for each input m at period 0,
something which of course must be weighted against its smaller
probability of success. For later use we formulate this condition
using a parameter λB, so that
γB (m) ≥ γG (m),γB (m) ≤ λBγG (m) (1)
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where the parameter λB satisﬁes




An example of such a pair of techniques is that where production
in the technique B is found as a constant times the production
in technique G, so that γB(m) = λBγG(m) for all m; we have
chosen the slightly more general formulation with a view to the
interpretation of the two-factor production function to be pro-
posed in Section 5.
From (1) and (2) it follows that expected output in technique G
exceeds that of technique B; indeed, if input m is inserted, then
expected output in G is (π1 + π2)γG(m) and expected output in
B is
π1γB (m) ≤ π1λBγG (m) < (π1 + π2)γG (m). (3)
It should be noticed that the simple structure of uncertainty as
formulated here means that success or failure is something which
hits all ﬁrms (in both countries) simultaneously, being industry-
speciﬁc rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc. This structure has been chosen
so as to exclude asymmetries between economically ‘large’ and
‘small’ countries, relying on the law of large numbers (cf. e.g.
Keiding and Knudsen (2003)).
In order to ﬁnance the investment in inputs at period 0, ﬁrms
may issue bonds (whether or not the market will accept the
bonds is a problem which will be looked into later) or possibly use
a bank. The bonds are to be repaid in period 1 if the investment
succeeds; if it fails there is no repayment. The bond market is
characterized by a repayment rate R, which is what the ﬁrm pays
in case of success.
As it was mentioned above, we assume that only success or failure
of the investment is generally observable, but that the ﬁrms’
choices of technique cannot be observed by others. This means
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that we have a problem of moral hazard: At the bond repayment
rate R, the ﬁrm will prefer G if expected proﬁts (given that the
input has been chosen optimally for this technique) is better with
G than with B:
max
m [π1 (γG (m) − Rm) + π2 (γG (m) − Rm)] >
max
m [π1 (γB (m) − Rm)], (4)
where we have assumed without loss of generality that the (con-
tingent) price of the commodity is 1 in each state s,s = 1,2,3,
and similarly, technique B is chosen if
max
m [π1 (γB (m) − Rm)] >
max
m [π1 (γG (m) − Rm) + π2 (γG (m) − Rm)]. (5)
Note that we have assumed that input chosen by the ﬁrm remains
concealed to the general public as well, since otherwise the input
choice would reveal the choice of technique.
The incentive compatibility conditions in (3) and (4) mean that
the choice of technique depends on the current repayment rate in
the bond market, so that ﬁrms may choose G at low repayment
rates and B at higher repayment rates. We shall exploit this fact
in our model when we introduce the two-country aspect which
has not yet been used. Indeed, we assume that bonds can be
diﬀerentiated by the general public according to the country of
origin, so that bonds issued in the ﬁrst country have repayment
rate R and bonds issued in the second country R∗.
Once we have two diﬀerent repayment rates, there are several
cases to investigate. The repayment rates may be such that ﬁrms
in both countries choose the same technique which may be G or
B; these cases are not particularly interesting, since the bonds
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will then be considered as equal in the market, so that the two-
country aspect disappears. However, if the bond rates diﬀer, say
R < R∗, so that country 1 chooses G and country 2 B, then, as
we shall see in the next section, the countries will end up in very
diﬀerent positions even if they were identical in their economic
characteristics. Finally, it may be the case that the bond market
does not accept bonds issued in one of the countries, say country
2, opening up for the activities of private banks, a possibility to
be investigated in Section 4 below.
Before we proceed with the study of the situation with two dif-
ferent bond repayment rates, we return to the choices of the
ﬁrm in period 0 which involves not only a choice of technique
but also the level of operation of the technique, that is the in-
put level which maximizes intertemporal proﬁts. For ﬁrms in
country 1, having access to investment at the repayment rate
R the optimal choice of m is that for which expected proﬁts
(π1+π2)(γG(m)−Rm) are maximal, so that optimal input level
mR satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
γ
′
G (mR) = R. (6)
For the ﬁrms in country 2 being exposed to repayment rate R∗
and choosing technique B, we get the similar expression
γ
′















B (mR∗) > γ
′
G (mR). (9)
For later use we state this trivial but useful result.
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Proposition 1. Assume that γ′
B(m) ≤ λBγ′
G(m) for all m. If R∗ >
R, then the optimal input choices in country 1 and 2 satisfy
mR > mR∗.
Summing up so far, the workings of the ﬁnancial sector, which to
this moment consists only of a bond market, can – provided the
equilibrium in the bond market results in suﬃciently diﬀerent
repayment rates for bonds originating in two countries – result
in one country choosing risky investment with lower expected
productivity, and moreover employing less input, than the other
country choosing the less risky investment. As a result the level
of activity in the two countries will diﬀer, and, as we shall see,
there will be lower levels of consumption in one country than in
the other.
In the next section we shall show that the situation described
is compatible with equilibrium behaviour of consumer-savers in
the two countries.
3 Consumer Choice and Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce the consumer demanding bonds for
the purpose of transferring value from period 0 to period 1. As
it was mentioned above, we deliberately keep the speciﬁcation
identical in the two countries (something which by the way is
in line with classical trade theory as well) in order to focus on
asymmetries arising from ﬁnancial institutions.
We assume that there are two types of consumers, savers and
entrepreneurs, diﬀering in their endowment, each endowed with
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u deﬁned on con-
sumption in period 1 (of the single commodity). The consumer-
saver has an initial endowment of 1 unit in period 0 and no
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access to production, whereas the consumer-entrepreneur owns
a ﬁrm, which in turn is described by the two techniques G and
B as discussed in the previous section. Since all consumers are
alike and have the same possibilities of choice, their number is
not important, all that matters is their total endowment, which
we set to 1. In the following we investigate the representative
consumer having this endowment.
In the case of most interest, where there are two diﬀerent types
of bonds, with repayment rates R and R∗, in the market, the
consumer-saver (in either country) faces the budget constraint
x1 ≤ Rz + R
∗z
∗, x2 ≤ Rz,z + z
∗ = 1, x3 = 0, (10)
where xs is the consumption in state s, for s = 1,2,3, and z
and z∗ are the investments in the bonds of country 1 and 2, re-
spectively. The budget constraint of the consumer-entrepreneur
is rather trivial, since consumption in state s is given by the
output in this state minus repayment if output is positive.
Now we describe the equilibrium of the model. For this we need
the demand for bonds of the consumers performing saving, found




∗)+π2u(Rz) = π1u(Rz + R
∗ (1 − z))+π2u(Rz),
(11)
to be equal to the supply of bonds. The ﬁrst order condition for









assuming that the maximum is attained for z in the interior of
[0,1], which means that both bonds are demanded by the savers,
the case which will interest us most in the sequel. Conversely,
200 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.5, n.2, p.189–219, Jul/Dec. 2004Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade
since u is concave, an interior solution of (12) entails that the
consumer-saver will demand bonds from both countries.
Conditions for both bonds to be bought in equilibrium is given
in the following proposition; we insert the expressions x1 = Rz+
R∗(1 − z), x2 = Rz in (12) to get
γ′











G (z)z + γ′
B (1 − z)(1 − z))
#
, (13)
and check whether this equation may be satisﬁed for some z  = 0.
Proposition 2. Assume that the production functions γG and γB
satisfy the following well-behavedness conditions:
(i) γ′
j(0) ≥ Kγ′





, j,k ∈ {B,G}, j  =
k,
(ii) the function z  → zγ′(z) is continuous in [0,1] with value
0 at z = 0.
If π2 is small, then there is an equilibrium with savings z0
such that 0 < z0 < 1.
The assumption (i) in Proposition 2 connects the marginal prod-
ucts of the diﬀerent techniques taken in diﬀerent input combi-
nations; it implies that the production must display decreasing
returns to scale, and it will be satisﬁed if both production func-
tions exhibit suﬃciently high marginal productivity at 0; part
(ii) rules out that marginal productivity is inﬁnitely large at 0.
Our next task is to investigate the supply side of the bond mar-
ket. For the two types of bonds to exist simultaneously, we must
have that ﬁrms in country 1 choose technique G and ﬁrms in
country 2 choose B. For this we need to check that the in-
centive compatibility conditions (4) and (5) are satisﬁed, some-
thing which in its turn will depend on marginal products (equal
to repayment rates in equilibrium) in the two techniques. The
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proposition stated below gives conditions on the technology un-
der which there will indeed be diﬀerent choices of technique in
the two countries.











B (1 − z)
for all z ∈ [0,1] satisfying (11). Then the model admits an equi-
librium with R < R∗, where ﬁrms in country 1 choose G and
ﬁrms in country 2 choose B.
The assumptions on the production functions γj made in Propo-
sition 3 relate average and marginal products of the produc-
tion functions. Since production functions are concave, marginal
product to be smaller than average product at any ﬁxed input;
we need however to compare marginal product at some input
with average product at another (the two input levels which are
optimal at the two repayment rates). Thus the assumption (i)
states that marginal product in technique G at input z (which
equals R, the cost of credits) is smaller than average product at
1 − z, when the latter is scaled down by a factor capturing that
B gives more output but with smaller probability; thus (i) says
that the cost of credit in G is smaller than what could possi-
bly be paid in B. The assumption (ii) amounts to stating that
average product at the input level mR is smaller than marginal
product at mR∗, which seems reasonable in view of Proposition
1. In both cases, the assumptions will be fulﬁlled if the input
level in country 2 is small compared to that of country 1.
Using the results obtained we may now summarize the discussion
in the following main theorem.
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Theorem 1. Under the assumptions stated in Propositions 1 –
3, there is an equilibrium with two types of bonds having diﬀer-
ent repayment rates. This equilibrium is Pareto inoptimal in the
following strong sense: There is another allocation with no trans-
fers of commodities between countries which gives higher expected
utility to every consumer in every country.
It should be noted that one of the distinctive features of the
asymmetric equilibrium is that some of the endowment in coun-
try 2 is taken to the country 1 for investment; thus, we have an
equilibrium with capital outﬂow. This happens even though the
two countries are identical with respect to their characteristics
– they have the same number of identical consumers and identi-
cal ﬁrms. This identity of countries has of course been assumed
to stress that the asymmetry which occurs in the equilibrium
is a phenomenon brought about by the economic institutions
rather than by objective causes (it is a ‘sunspot’ phenomenon).
Consequently, the institutions (which are the generally approved
institutions of liberalized trade and capital movements) need to
be blamed, or rather, need to be revised.
One way in which a welfare improvement might be achieved
would be to allow ﬁrms of country 2 to apply for credit directly
in country 1; while this will indeed represent a Pareto improve-
ment in our situation, it is not quite in line with the logic of our
model, where credit so far is to be obtained only through the
bond market which discriminates against country 2 ﬁrms. The
introduction in the next section of a ﬁnancial intermediary does
however take us in some way in the same direction.
Although the existence of equilibria with asymmetry in invest-
ment conditions has been our primary concern, it should be men-
tioned that the model admits also another, symmetric equilib-
rium; there are two types of such equilibria:
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(1) Bonds of the two countries have the same repayment rate and
the choice of technique is identical in the two countries. Whether
this choice is G or B will depend on the marginal products in the
two techniques at the symmetric input levels z = 1
2. Intuitively,
one would expect this choice to be G, and this will be the case
if λB is not too big. In this case, going from the asymmetric
to the symmetric case would represent a welfare improvement;
however, in the model there is no obvious way of moving from
one equilibrium to another.
(2) Bonds are distinguishable but consumers demand only one
type. In this case production is concentrated in one country, and
by our parameter choices, the technique chosen is G. The con-
centration of production in one country represents an eﬃciency
loss. In the following section, we consider situations where this
loss may be avoided by introduction of a ﬁnancial intermediary.
4 Financial Intermediation
In this section, we consider the case where the bond market
does not sustain two types of bonds; this may happen if γ′
B(0)
is smaller than the smallest repayment rate R∗ for which the
consumer will want to hold a bond giving R∗ in state 1 and
nothing in the other states. The lack of a market for bonds from
ﬁrms in country 2 means that investment in the country’s ﬁrms
will not be forthcoming, so that output at period 1 as well as
the income of the consumer-entrepreneurs of this country is 0.
All investment takes place in country 1.
Following the suggestions of contemporary microeconomic the-
ory of banks, there is in this situation room for another type
of ﬁnancial institution in country 2. This ﬁnancial intermediary
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(or ‘bank’) will obtain loans from the general public, possibly by
issuing bonds, and oﬀer credits to ﬁrms in country 2; the new
aspect of this situation is that the ﬁnancial intermediary has the
possibility of monitoring the investment of the ﬁrm. We shall
assume that this monitoring may be carried out to diﬀerent de-
gree according to the choice of the bank: We assume that what
is chosen is the proportion ρ ∈ [0,1] of ﬁrms to be controlled;
if a ﬁrm is controlled, it will choose technique G independent
of the repayment rate R∗
b which it has accepted with the bank;
otherwise we assume that R∗
b is suﬃciently high so that the ﬁrm
will choose B. The cost to the bank of controlling the proportion
ρ of ﬁrms is ρc, where c > 0 is a constant.
Denote by Rb the repayment rate oﬀered to the consumer-savers.
Given Rb and ρ, the consumer-saver will choose the proportion z
invested in bonds of country 1 so as to maximize expected utility
π1u(Rz + Rb (1 − z)) + π2u(Rz + ρRb (1 − z)), (14)




π1u′(˜ x1) + π2u′ (˜ x2)
π1u′(˜ x1) + ρπ2u′ (˜ x2)
, (15)
with ˜ x1 = Rz+Rb(1−z), ˜ x2 = Rz+ρRb(1−z), from which the
demand for bank bonds at repayment rate Rb may be found as
1 − z. The rate R∗
b which the bank proposes to its debtors may





b + (1 − ρ)m
B
R∗





b are optimal input levels at repayment rate
R∗
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A proﬁt maximizing bank will choose the decision variables Rb
and ρ in such a way that the expected proﬁt [(π1 + π2ρ)(R∗
b −
Rb)](1 − z) − ρc is maximal.
The question of whether a bond market for country 1 debt can
coexist with a monopolistic bank in country 2 is not entirely
trivial. As in previous sections, we need some speciﬁc structure
on the production functions in order to be sure that there is an
equilibrium of the type we are interested in. In our present case
the assumptions must be such that without a ﬁnancial interme-
diary, there is an equilibrium with zero production in country 2,
and such that the gains from spreading production as a result of
the activity of the ﬁnancial intermediary exceed the cost of mon-
itoring the choice of technique. This is speciﬁed in the following
proposition.






































Then there is no market for country 2 bonds, but there is an
equilibrium with bond market for country 1 and a proﬁt maxi-
mizing bank in country 2. This equilibrium is characterized by
incomplete monitoring, 0 < ρ < 1.
In the setup considered here, where the ﬁnancing of ﬁrms in
country 1 is carried out via the bond market, whereas the ﬁrms
in country 2 use a ﬁnancial intermediary, since the bond market
will not accept country 2 bonds, it comes as no surprise that the
credit allocation established by the intermediary brings a Pareto
improvement relative to the alternative which is no credits at all
in country 2. On the other hand, the monopolistic behaviour of
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the bank gives rise to the usual distortions due to higher inter-
est margin than what is dictated by monitoring cost alone; this
distortion results in smaller than optimal production in coun-
try 2, larger than optimal production in country 1. It should be
emphasized that this is a loss which goes beyond the cost of mon-
itoring debtors and it is strictly related to monopolistic pricing
behaviour.
There is however, another problem which has not been consid-
ered here, namely that of asymmetric information with respect
to the monitoring activity carried out by the bank. It has been
assumed throughout that savers know the (true) inspection rate
ρ when making their portfolio decisions. If however ρ is not gen-
erally observable, we have a new situation. The bank may be
tempted to reduce its value, thereby saving monitoring cost, and
in lack of other counterbalancing features, which would have to
be introduced into the model, the only possible inspection level
would then be 0 in which case the bank would get no deposits.
We shall not expand on this problem of equilibrium choice of
inspection level by banks, which on the one hand opens up for a
discussion of the role of banks in the recent ﬁnancial downturns
of some countries, but on the other hand would take us away
from the central message of the model, namely that high inter-
est levels (and high country risk) may be caused by the system of
ﬁnancing investment rather than by the fundamental economic
structures of the countries.
5 Extensions of the Model
The model which has been discussed in the previous sections has
been designed for the study of problems of capital ﬂows under
the conditions of liberalized trade and capital movements. It may
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be argued that the two-country aspects of the model are not very
elaborated, since countries are only identiﬁed by the productive
ﬁrms, which are considered as non-transferable national identi-
ties, and from the distinction between debt contracted by ﬁrms
in one country and ﬁrms in another country which is derived
from the national character of the ﬁrms.
Apart from this, the two-country framework does not put limita-
tions on the economic activites of the agents; thus, the consumer-
savers were behaved identically whether they were situated in
one country or another. On the other hand, most of the tradi-
tional features of two-country models of international trade may
be introduced into the model without modifying the basic struc-
ture and the conclusions of the model. Thus, we may add another
type of consumer, namely consumers endowed with labor power,
which is used as input in the ﬁrms’ intertemporal production,
giving rise to a wage paid out of the ﬁnished product. These
consumers are speciﬁc for the country and cannot migrate. To
introduce this feature, we need only to reinterprete the produc-
tion functions fj(m) as
fj (m) = Fj (m,L), j ∈ {B,G}, (18)
where Fj(m,L) is a constant return to scale production function
in the two productive factors commodity and labour, and L is
the total labour endowment, assumed to be identical in the two
countries. Now everything goes as before, with wages taking the
place of the proﬁts of consumer-entrepreneurs.
Another feature which might be added to the model has to do
with the belief structure; in the preceding results, we have shown
that asymmetric equilibria may arise but we have not given any
explanation of why they should arise. It should be remembered
that the symmetric equilibrium, where each country invests 1/2
and where bonds, even if country-speciﬁc, have the same price
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in the market, is also possible. Without further structure in the
model, we have only established that asymmetries may arise, not
that they must arise.
A possible explanation of the phenomenon that the money mar-
ket expects higher risk in country 2 than in country 1 – an ex-
pectation which in our model leads to high interest rates driving
the ﬁrms into risky investments which then conﬁrm the expec-
tation of high risk – can be obtained if we introduce diﬀerences
in the initial wealth of countries, which will lead to diﬀerences
in the situations of the two ﬁrms as to the likelihood of moral
hazard eﬀects, since ﬁrms of wealthy countries borrow less and
invest more of their own wealth. Therefore, we introduce own
investment by ﬁrms. Assume that country 1 ﬁrms are able to
ﬁnance some of their production by own means, not resorting to
the loan market, whereas country 2 ﬁrms either do not have this
possibility or at least are less well endowed with such capital.
This means that the countries are no longer absolutely identical,
country 1 being richer than country 2, but otherwise they have
access to the same technology, have identical labour endowment
etc. In this situation we must distinguish between country 1 and
country 2 production functions, with
γ
i








j′ i = 1,2, j ∈ {B,G}, (19)
where mi
0 denotes the initial capital available in ﬁrms of coun-
try i. Thus, the production function γi
j(m) gives the net output
resulting from adding m to the already existing input mi
0, which
of course has to be reestablished afterwards (if possible). We
assume that if a project fails, then all capital, own as well as
borrowed, is lost, meaning that expected proﬁts of country 1
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B (m) − Rm
￿
− (π2 + π3)m
i
0 (21)
in case of technique B.
We show that in this situation, the change of technique from
G to B takes place at a higher repayment rate, the higher the
initial level of capital endowment.
Proposition 5. Assume that m1
0 > m2
0. If ˆ Ri is the repayment
rate at which ﬁrms in country i are indiﬀerent between the two
techniques, i = 1,2, then ˆ R1 > ˆ R2.
The fact that the richer (in terms of ﬁrms’ initial investments)
country is more likely to choose G than the poorer country –
or, otherwise put, rich countries are less likely to be aﬀected by
moral hazard – gives a rationalization of the asymmetric beliefs
which in are their turn sustained by asymmetric equilibria. Thus,
it comes as no surprise that rich countries have low interest rates
and choose the less risky techniques, whereas the poorer coun-
tries are forced into a choice of risky investments, giving sub-
stance to the beliefs among investors. However, the explanation
has the possible disadvantage of reducing the asymmetry to a
phenomenon which is partially explained by diﬀerences of en-
dowments, or comparative advantage in receiving credits. Still
the model retains the main message that slow development in
some countries may be caused by the system of credit allocation
rather than by speciﬁc circumstances of economic or political na-
ture. The standard explanation of the economic diﬃculties of the
less developed countries of e.g. Latin America is turned around,
since the bad average performance of the countries is an eﬀect
rather than a cause of their low rating in ﬁnancial markets.
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6 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have developed a simple model of
international credit and investment, with uncertainty playing a
crucial role; the choice of technique in the investment projects
is crucially dependent on the rate of interest, forcing countries
exposed to a high rate of interest to choose risky investments,
thereby reinforcing the opinions of the savers as to the credit-
worthiness of these countries. This may lead to a breakdown of
the bond market for investment in such countries, a situation
which opens up for the operation of banks which may oﬀer cred-
its to investors given that they monitor (partially or fully) the
behaviour of the debtors. Thus, the banks fulﬁl a role in interna-
tional ﬁnance which cannot be performed by a competitive bond
market.
Clearly, the model focuses on a particular aspect of banking,
and its general recommendation of enhancing the functioning of
ﬁnancial intermediaries should of course be seen in this light;
banking is in the present study synonymous with monitoring of
credits, and even so, the viability of the arrangement depends
on whether the monitoring performed by the banks is in accor-
dance with the expectation of the public. Seen in this light the
results are compatible with possible negative eﬀects of the bank-
ing sector in aggrevating rather than alleviating crises (such as
may have been the case in Argentina, cf. e.g. della Paolera and
Taylor (2003)).
It has been a main point of the model that the countries were
identical at the outset, so that eventual asymmetries in ﬁnal
allocation must be caused by the institutions rather than by
the underlying characteristics of the economies. In particular,
instead of the asymmetric equilibria there might have been a
symmetric one, where both countries produced identical amounts
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of goods and consumers enjoyed identical levels of utility (recall
that in our model, uncertainty is not country-speciﬁc, so it hits
each country in the same way). However, the market may result
in the asymmetric situation, where too much is produced in one
country, too little in the other, and with the welfare reducing
greater risk sustained by the market (or, alternatively, by the
ﬁnancial intermediary).
Thus, the model may be considered as one way of explaining why
standard trade theory, according to which investment would ﬂow
towards the country exhibiting the highest marginal productiv-
ity, does not predict the actual state of aﬀairs very well. Marginal
productivity may well be considerably higher in poor countries
than in rich ones (where interest rates by now are historically
low), but the market mechanism cannot allocate savings to their
best purpose when uncertainty and information asymmetries are
present. Thus, the model shows that we have to take market fail-
ure into consideration also when considering international capi-
tal markets, which are as much subject to market failure as any
other market.
The model does not point directly to what can be done to rem-
edy the situation. On one hand, a bank which fully monitors the
investers in country 2 may indeed provide a second best solu-
tion to the welfare maximization problem, but then the question
arises whether such a bank can be given the right incentive struc-
ture to support such a solution. The model in its present version
is probably too oversimpliﬁed to give answers to such questions,
which therefore remain topics for future research.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Propositions
In this section, we give the proofs of the propositions and theo-
rems stated in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to prove that there is a value
of z diﬀerent from 0 and 1 so that the equation (13), restated
below as
γ′











G (z)z + γ′
B (1 − z)(1 − z))
#
, (22)
is satisﬁed. Using (i) we have that for z = 0, the left-hand side





, which is smaller than
1, whereas the right-hand side may be assessed using (ii), from
which it follows that it takes a value ≥ 1. For z = 1 we use again













By continuity there is z0 strictly between 0 and 1 such that
equality obtains in (11), showing existence of equilibrium where
both types of bonds are demanded. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that R and R∗ together with
mR and mR∗ satisfy (6) – (7) above.
We show ﬁrst that ﬁrms in country 1 satisfy (4), so that G is
the preferred technique. Suppose ﬁrst that input is ﬁxed at m∗
R,
which is the input maximizing the right-hand side in (4); then
technique G is as good as B at the repayment rate R if
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Since γB (mR∗) ≤ λBγG (mR∗), we have that
ˆ R
∗ ≥







where we have used (i). On the other hand, by (6) we have that
R = γ′
G (mR), and we may conclude that R ≤ ˆ R∗, so that tech-
nique G is as good as B at the input level mR∗; since mR is the
input level at which G is as good as possible we conclude that
(4) is satisﬁed.
We show in a similar way that also ﬁrms in country 2 satisfy the












Then technique B is as good as G at input mR if R∗ ≥ ˆ R. Since






B (mR∗) = R
∗, (27)
and we conclude that B is as good as G when input is mR. It
follows now easily that (5) is satisﬁed, so that B is chosen in
country 2.
Proof of Theorem 1: The existence of an equilibrium follows from
Propositions 1 – 3: From Proposition 2 we have that there are
divisions of total savings into investments in the two techniques
and corresponding levels of repayment for which the consumers
want to hold both types of bonds, and from Proposition 3 we
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get that these repayment rates are such that ﬁrms in country 1
choose technique G and ﬁrms in country 2 choose technique B.
Since the bond market and the market for inputs (which coincide
in the model) are in balance, we have an equilibrium with the
desired properties.
To show the second part of the theorem, we notice that the
allocation where the endowment of each country is inserted in
the production of the same country using technique G results in
higher expected utility for each consumer (saver or entrepreneur)
than the equilibrium with diﬀerent bond types. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: If bonds of country 2 enter the portfolio









(there is a nonzero input level for ﬁrms of country 2 which is
compatible with the repayment rate at which country 2 bonds
can be accepted by the savers). However, this contradicts the
assumption (a) of the proposition, and we conclude that country
2 bonds will not be accepted.
Turning to the monopolistic bank in country 2, it has the option
of choosing ρ = 1 (perfect monitoring), so that all country 2 ﬁrms
choose G. The bank will oﬀer the savers a repayment Rb = R
and charge the debtors a repayment R∗
b such that (π1+π2)(R∗
b −
R)mR∗
b −c ≥ 0. Such a repayment R∗
b exists, since the bank may
choose to have deposits of size mR∗ = 1
4, which will be accepted






, and since z = 3
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which is ≥ 0 by assumption (b).
We have shown that there is a decision (ρ,R∗
b) at which the
bank earns nonnegative proﬁts, and consequently (as the decision
variables belong to compact intervals and the proﬁt function is
continuous) there is a proﬁt maximizing decision as well. We
show that the monitoring level ρ = 1 is not optimal (ρ = 0 is
excluded since in that case the consumer-savers will not place
their savings with the bank). Indeed, from (15) we have that
Rb = R
π1u′(˜ x1) + π2u′(˜ x2)
π1u′(˜ x1) + ρπ2u′ (˜ x2)
, (30)







Thus, reducing ρ from the value 1 means that the bank will have
to pay more to the savers to retain the previous market share;
















Since this inequality holds due to assumption (b), we have that
ρ = 1 is not an optimal choice of the bank. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: Changing mi























− (π1 + π3) = π1 ˆ R
i − (π2 + π3), (33)
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which shows that Πi
G increases more than Πi
B when mi
0 gets
larger, from which the conclusion follows. ￿
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